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Primitive Law 
Dr Christoph Kletzer, King’s College London
Consider the following ancient Germanic rules regulating murder:  
At the beginning of the legal development the killing, 
in however manner it was conducted, could only have 
two possible legal results: either the person killed 
stood outside of the legal community of the killer: 
then, by rights, nothing followed. Or he was part of 
the legal community: then the killer immediately, that 
is ipso facto et iure dropped out of  the legal community.1 
This regime consists of  two rules: 
Rule1 If someone takes the life of a member of our legal 
community he ipso facto et iure is no longer a member of our legal 
community. 
Rule2 If someone takes the life of someone who is not a 
member of  our legal community then legally nothing happens.
Thus, if a member of our community (let us call him 
Adalbert) takes the life of another member of the legal community 
(let us call him Wilco) then the only result the regime provides for 
is that Adalbert becomes a non-member of  the legal community.
WilcoAdalbert kills
leads to
WilcoAdalbert kills
This change of status is the immediate result of the offence, 
it occurs ipso facto et iure, i.e. there is no need for adjudication or 
legal procedure, be it formal or informal.
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1
1 Bernhard Rehfeldt, ‘Die Vergeistigung des Rechtes. Zur Frage der 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Rechtsentwicklung’ (1950) 67 Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanische Abteilung 373, 380.
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Now, this immediate legal effect produces a secondary, 
collateral effect: imagine the case in which someone else (let us call 
him Wernhar) takes the life of  Adalbert. 
Wernhar
WilcoAdalbert kills
kills
Now, since Adalbert is not a member of the community, 
taking his life is covered by Rule2 and thus triggers no legal effect, 
particularly not the legal effect of jeopardising Wernhar’s 
membership in the community.2 Consequently Wernhar’s deed does 
not have the legal effect of rendering a killing of him legally 
irrelevant.
So after Wernhar has killed Adalbert matters will very likely 
come to an end: ‘Cases are legion where one private-enemy kills 
another, successively gets killed by the family members of the one 
killed and the matter hereby comes to an end.’3 
In this paper I am going to treat this regime as being 
exemplary of what I call primitive law,4 and I am going to discuss 
five suggestions derived from an investigation of this primitive 
legal regime:
PRIMITIVE LAW 2
2
2 ‘There exists permitted murder. Only the one not permitted is a violation of  
the law.’ Brunner, Heinrich and Schwerin, Claudius Freiherr von, Deutsche 
Rechtsgeschichte. Band II (2nd edn, Duncker und Humboldt 1928) 816.
3 Hans-Rudolf  Hagemann, ‘Vom Verbrechenskatalog des altdeutschen 
Strafrechts.’ (1974) 91 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. 
Germanische Abteilung 10. 
4 Despite plenty and good, if  a bit dated, research supporting the conviction 
that the example above consists of  rules which were in force and applied by 
actual historic people, in this paper the term ‘primitive’ is used more in a logical 
than in a historic sense. This paper does not intend to make any strong historic 
claim nor relies on such claims. Rather ‘primitive’ denotes the quality of  
something being neither developed nor derived from anything else. It relates 
more to what Paulson calls the ‘ideal form of  legal norms’. So, even though I do 
believe that Rehfeldt, Hagemeann et al were right in their assessment of  ancient 
Germanic law, I do not need them to be right.  See Stanley Paulson, ‘On Ideal 
Form, Empowering Norms, and "Normative Functions"’ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 
84.
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1. Primitive law does not tell everyone what they ought to 
do. It rather tells them what they have done.
2. Primitive law is an organisation of  violence. 
3. Primitive law coerces by declaring violence irrelevant. 
4. Primitive law monopolises  force by identifying certain social 
forces as its own forces. 
5. All law is fundamentally primitive law.  
A. Primitive Law
The primitive regime introduced above is not modelled on moral 
commands.5  It is, emphatically, not to be understood as a 
command cum threat of sanction, or command cum secondary 
rules, or command cum best moral justification, or command cum 
justification in terms of acting in accordance with reasons which 
apply to one independently of  the command. 
The primitive regime does not tell people what they ought to to, 
but rather what they have done. The primitive rules do not determine 
that Adalbert ought not to kill Wilco. Nor do they determine that if 
Adalbert kills Wilco, Adalbert ought to be killed. Nor do they 
determine that if Adalbert kills Wilco, Adalbert ought to lose his 
membership in the tribe. What they set down is that Adalbert by 
killing Wilco has  already lost his membership in the tribe: killing a 
member is the same as, it means loss of membership. The rules 
thus tell us what Adalbert has done. 
Irrespective of whether Adalbert has really jeopardised his 
membership in the tribe in a sociological or psychological or 
otherwise ‘factual’ sense, the rules allow us interpret Adalbert as 
having lost his membership. In allowing a certain interpretation the 
rules function as a scheme of  interpretation. 
This primitive regime schematises the interpretation of 
violence in the following way: acts of violence have a certain legal 
meaning, i.e. loss of membership. Under special circumstances, 
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3
5 ‘Legal commands and prescriptions are essentially foreign to the Germans.’ 
Bernhard Rehfeldt, ‘Recht, Religion und Moral bei den frühen 
Germanen’ (1954) 71 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. 
Germanische Abteilung 10.
however, the very same acts of violence have no legal meaning. 
Legally, some acts of  violence are explicitly made irrelevant. 
By declaring certain acts of violence irrelevant, the regime 
establishes a coercive order.6  It does so in the following doubly 
indirect manner: given the realisation of a certain condition (killing 
of a member), certain acts of violence (killing of a member-killer) 
are declared legally irrelevant and are thus indirectly allowed. By 
indirectly allowing these acts, the realisation of the condition is 
indirectly forbidden.  
This primitive regime governs murder not by starting with 
the prohibition as the primary norm and then the addition of rules 
about the application of a sanction as a secondary norm.7  Nor 
does it command a sanction as a primary norm, from which the 
prohibition of the action under threat of sanction can be derived 
as a secondary norm.8 Rather, this primitive regime knows only the 
primary norms that if someone kills a member he loses his 
membership and thus that if someone kills a member-killer, nothing 
happens. Everything else is opinion. Everything else is left to the 
members to make out for themselves. It is derivative and can thus 
be called ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’.
Of course, the norm, that under certain circumstances 
killing someone has no legal consequences will pre-structure the 
reasoning of the members. If they are reasonable, considering the 
primary norms above will make them say to themselves: (a) ‘I ought 
not to kill another member.’ This, however, means: (b) ‘If I do not 
want to be killed, I ought not to kill another member’, which, in 
turn, is shorthand for (c) ‘If I don’t want there to be no legal 
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4
6 The question whether coercion is a constitutive element of  the nature of  law 
has been a recurring question in jurisprudence. The claim that coercion does not 
form an element of  the nature of  law, this is still a minority position. See Grant 
Lamond, ‘Coercion and the Nature of  Law’ (2001) 7 Legal Theory 35.
7 This is roughly the way in which HLA Hart uses the terms ‘primary rule’ and 
‘secondary rule’. See HLA Hart, The Concept of  Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 
1994) 79-99.
8 This is the way in which Kelsen sometimes uses the terms ‘primary norm’ and 
‘secondary norm’. It is the opposite to Hart’s use of  these terms. See Hans 
Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer 1925) 51. For a discussion of  the ‘ideal 
form’ of  legal norms see Stanley Paulson, ‘An Empowerment Theory of  Legal 
Norms’ (1988) 1 Ratio Juris 58 and Stanley Paulson, ‘On Ideal Form, 
Empowering Norms, and "Normative Functions"’ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 84.
consequences to someone killing me, I’d rather not kill another 
member.’ 
Norm (a) is a ‘quaternary’ norm, norm (b) is a ‘tertiary‘ 
norm and norm (c) is a ‘secondary’ norm. These norms are vested 
with only hypothetical normativity. Their bindingness depends on 
the motivation and beliefs of  the agents. 
Only the primary norms possess more than hypothetical 
normativity. The primary norms ‘If someone kills a member 
everyone is allowed to interpret him as having lost his 
membership’ and ‘If someone kills a member-killer everyone is 
allowed to interpret this as having no legal consequence’ are valid 
independently of the beliefs and motives of the agents. They apply 
categorically.9
Even though this normativity is categorical, it is still oblique. 
It does neither prescribe nor forbid anything. Rather it allows 
everyone to interpret the member-killer as having lost his 
membership. The categorical normativity can only be found in 
authorisation. In this regime primitive law does not forbid, it 
allows, it permits.10 
Take the following series of killings: Adalbert kills Wilco, in 
revenge Wernhar kills Adalbert, in revenge Arnulf kills Wernhar, in 
revenge Wilhelm kills Arnulf, in revenge Arwin kills Wilhelm. 
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5
9 This categorical validity of  the primary norms is, however, a result entirely of  
the epistemological rather than the practical validity of  these norms. Leif  Wenar 
was kind enough to point this out.  
10 For an interpretation of  Kelsen’s work that takes empowerment (Ermächtigung) 
to be the fundamental deontic operator of  the law see Paulson, ‘An 
Empowerment Theory’ (n 7) and Paulson, ‘On Ideal Form’ (n 7). For a criticism 
of  this position see Roberto J. Vernengo, ‘About an Empowerment Theory of  
Legal Norms and Sone Related Problems’ (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 299 and Ota 
Weinberger, ‘The Theory of  Legal Dynamics Reconsidered’ (1991) 4 Ratio Juris 
18, 30-32. See also Stanley Paulson and Bert van Roermund. ‘Kelsen, Authority 
and Competence: An Introduction’ (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 125; Bert van 
Roermund, ‘Authority and Authorisation’ (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 201.
Wilco
Adalbert
Wernhar
Arnulf
Wilhelm
Arwin
Viewed morally, this situation of repeated killing is but a 
disastrous state of war. Morality tells us things ought to be different, 
people ought to stop killing each other, there ought to be peace. 
The regime of primitive law, however, does not tell us what ought 
to be. It tells us what is. 
With the two simple rules given above primitive law allows 
us to interpret the actions of Adalbert, Arnulf and Arwin (the A-
clan) as having the legal effect of them losing their membership in 
our community, whereas the same actions of Wernhar and Wilhelm 
(the W-clan) do not have any legal effect. 
Wernhar
WilcoAdalbert kills
kills
Wilhelm
Arnulf kills
kills
Arwin kills
The killings of the W-clan are thus allowed, and the killings 
of the A-clan are forbidden. The killings of the A-clan are 
‘misdeeds’ and the killings of the W-clan are ‘sanctions’. The A-
clan is a band of criminals, whereas the members of the W-clan 
are the organs of the state, the W-clan is ‘the state’ that keeps the 
PRIMITIVE LAW 6
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peace. So the rules allow us to interpret the situation of war as 
peace. Morality demands that there ought to be peace. Primitive law 
tells us that what ought to be, actually already is. It orders the 
world not by telling it what it ought to be, but by telling it what it 
is. 
Primitive law allows to interpret war as peace-keeping. 
Insofar primitive law  pacifies the land not by demanding peace, 
but by declaring peace. The law  does not make peace by abolishing 
the use of force but by declaring a certain force to be its own 
force. It makes peace by monopolising force.11 
We tend to think that the law monopolises force by 
forbidding the use of force and  then somehow preventing the use 
of force. This, however, presupposes that the law already has 
force. However, the law, strictly speaking, does not have any actual 
power, it cannot force anyone to do anything. The law is language. 
 
Rather than forbidding and preventing the use of force, the 
law monopolises force by declaring a certain force legally 
irrelevant. It thus decides which social force is its own force. 
Primitive law does not monopolise force by somehow mustering 
an irresistible actual power and commanding everyone to refrain 
from using force. Rather, it declares a certain social force to be the 
legal force.   
The classical phrase non sub homine, sed sub lege  sets up the 
alternative of either being ruled by men or being ruled by law. It 
suggests an alternative of either being ruled by force or being 
ruled by language. However, both force and language by 
themselves are unfit to rule. 
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11 ‘The law attaches certain conditions to the use of  force in relations among 
men, authorising the employment of  force only by certain individuals and only 
under certain circumstances. The law allows conduct which, under all other 
circumstances, is to be considered as "forbidden". To be forbidden means to be 
the very condition for such a coercive act as a sanction. The individual who, 
authorised by the legal order, applies the coercive measure (the sanction), acts as 
an organ of  this order, or of  the community constituted thereby. And hence 
one may say that law makes the use of  force a monopoly of  the community. 
And precisely by so doing, law pacifies the community.’ in Kelsen, Hans. ‘The 
Law As a Specific Social Technique.’ (1941) 9 The University of  Chicago Law 
Review 75, 81.
Language by itself cannot dominate, language by itself 
cannot impose itself on a group of people.  But force, too, is by 
itself unfit to rule. No-one can rule by force alone. One able-
bodied man can dominate at best one or two other able-bodied 
men. In order to dominate more then these one or two, he needs 
support. So he might want to force the one or two men he 
dominates to support him dominate more men. He will only be 
successful in that attempt if the one or two men he dominates 
have enough force to dominate other men. In that case, however, 
each of them will also have enough force to in turn dominate the 
potential ruler by force alone. The potential ruler by force faces an 
irresolvable dilemma. In order to dominate others he needs the 
others to be weak. In order to dominate through others he needs 
them to be strong.12 Any rule thus necessarily includes something 
other than force. 
It is thus only through both, force and language (non solo 
homine, set etiam lege) through which the law rules and dominates. 
The regime of primitive law identifies the sovereign force 
among the existing forces. The law  does not create a consolidated 
force, rather, it consolidates force by declaring the prevalent 
historic force to be its own force. Insofar the law never needs to 
exert itself, it does not have to subject social power or fight an 
opposition. All it needs to do is to interpret an already existing 
social force to be the legal force. 
Primitive law really is, as Kelsen put it ‘an organisation of 
force.’13 What Kelsen has not made clear, however, is how force can 
be organised. Things can be organised by force. Force cannot be 
organised by force. Force can only be organised by language, by 
interpretation. The law, being an organisation of force, is an 
interpretation of  force. 
So to the extent to which the classic Hobbesian question 
(‘How was it possible that we transcended the state of nature into 
a state of society?’) presupposes that the transition from the status 
naturalis to the status civilis was in some sense a progress in the 
world of facts, it is misguided. The Leviathan does not emerge in 
PRIMITIVE LAW 8
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12 See Alexandre Kojève, ‘Tyranny and Wisdom’ in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny 
(University of  Chicago Press 2000) 144. 
13 Kelsen (n 10) 81.
the realm of facts but in the realm of social self-interpretation. 
The Leviathan is brought into being not by making it but by 
identifying it. The Leviathan is a scheme. 
What, then, is a scheme? The law as a scheme of 
interpretation must not be confused with a fiction. Adalbert is not 
treated by the law as if he lost his membership. He lost his 
membership—sans phrase. Traditionally, a fiction is an assumptio 
contra veritatem pro veritate in re certa.14 However, in our case we do 
not assume something to be true (pro veritate) against our firm 
knowledge (in re certa) that it is not true (contra veritatem). Primitive 
law does not assume anything against firm knowledge. It 
schematises actuality itself. 
Also, the scheme of interpretation must not be confused 
with a constitutive rule.15 The scheme does not tell us that killing a 
member counts as loss of membership. Primitive law does not take 
scores like a game does. The rule does not construct an 
institutional reality different from the actual reality, it does not 
establish a difference between a brute and an institutional fact. 
Rather, it informs us about a change that has taken place in the 
actual world itself.  
Rather than establishing a fictional or institutional account 
the rules schematise interpretation. In critical philosophy the 
notion of a ‘scheme’ links to the notions of the faculty of 
imagination, the faculty of making present something which is not 
present in sensual perception. Imagination projects an order into 
the world, an order, however, which is not merely superimposed 
on the real world, but which makes up the very reality of the real. 
Within the context of critical philosophy the faculty of 
imagination is not exhausted by allowing us to spontaneously 
create phantasy images, it also, and crucially, allows us to 
PRIMITIVE LAW 9
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14 See Pierre Oliver, Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science (Rotterdam 
University Press 1975).
15 See  John R Searle, The Construction of  Social Reality (Penguin 1995).
understand objectivity as objective.16  Imagination, for instance, 
allows us to actually experience objects as non-perspectival entities 
even though all we ever see from any given object are different 
perspectives.17 Imagination adds to experience in schematic form 
those things we do not perceive.
In a similar way the law’s schematising of interpretation tells 
us the following: you might not have noticed, you might not have 
realised it, but Adalbert actually has lost his membership in the 
community. It might not be readily visible, but this is what has 
actually happened. The rules thus do not talk about fictions, they 
do not establish separate institutional facts; rather they allow  us to 
experience a certain reality in its totality.18
PRIMITIVE LAW 10
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16 ‘Kant claims that the very same rule-governed conceptual activity that occurs 
in the free-play of  the imagination constitutes perceptual experience, when it is 
guided by independent reality. According to this interpretation, the ‘productive 
imagination’ (which is Kant’s term for the faculty that generates intuitive 
representings of  the form ‘this cube’) provides the subject-terms of  perceptual 
judgments.’  Winfried Sellars, Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics, (Ridgeview 2002) 
273. See also Gary Banham, Kant’s Transcendental Imagination (Palgrave Macmillan 
2005). 
17 ‘Consider as an example a perceptual experience such as that you might enjoy 
if  you were to hold a bottle in your hand with eyes closed. You have a sense of  
the presence of  the whole bottle, even though you only make contact with the 
bottle at a few isolated points ... One way we might try to explain this is by 
observing that you draw on your knowledge of  what bottles are .... You bring to 
bear your conceptual skills. This is doubtless right. But it does not, I think, do 
justice to the phenomenology of  the experience. For, crucially, your sense of  
the presence of  the bottle is a sense of  its perceptual presence. That is, you do 
not merely think or infer that there is a bottle present, in the way, say, that you 
think or infer that there is a room next door. The presence of  the bottle is not 
inferred or surmised. It is experienced.’ Alva Noë, ‘Is the World a Grand 
Illusion?’ in Alva Noë (ed),  Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion? (Imprint 
Academic 2002) 8-9.
18 ‘It may be remembered, from Kelsen, that norms serve as a scheme of  
interpretation. They invest events and structures with significance. From a legal 
point of  view, x counts as y (an utterance as an oath, for example). Norms can 
be used, therefore, to idealise realities and thus to render social facts expressive 
of  ideals or of  something evil.’ Alexander Somek, ‘Idealisation, de-politicization 
and economic due process: System transition in the European Union’ in Bogdan 
Iancu (ed) The law/politics distinction in contemporary public law adjudication (Eleven 
International 2009). 
B. Modern Law
All law is primitive law. 
What distinguishes modern law from primitive law  is not a 
difference in the technique applied. Modern law, too, is a technique 
of ordering society by schematising an interpretation of violence 
as legally irrelevant.
Modern law differs from primitive law not in its functioning, 
but first and foremost in the degree of  centralisation.19   
As we have seen, primitive law  establishes a de-centralised 
system of self-help. The rules are created by no-one20 and applied 
by everyone. We heard that Wernhar is permitted to kill Adalbert, 
since Adalbert has killed Wilco. But who establishes the fact that 
Adalbert really has killed Wilco? It is Wernhar himself who is judge 
in this case. He is judge and executive organ in one person. He 
legally determines that Adalbert has lost his membership in the 
community, since Adalbert has killed Wilco; as a consequence he 
can kill Adalbert without this act having any legal consequence. 
However, Arnulf may reach a different conclusion.  He, too, 
acts as a judge and executive force in one person and he might 
differ about the membership-status of Wilco. He might be of the 
opinion, or, for that matter, even know, that Wilco had killed 
Ansgar; he might thus declare that Wilco has thereby lost his 
membership, thus permitting Adalbert’s killing of Wilco, thus 
leading to Wernhar’s loss of membership, thus making a killing of 
Wernhar legally irrelevant.  
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19 This idea is, of  course, taken from Kelsen, who treats the difference between 
primitive legal systems (ancient legal systems and international legal regimes) 
and modern legal systems not as a difference between systems consisting of  
only primary norms and one consisting of  primary and secondary norms, but 
rather as a difference in centralisation. Hans Kelsen ‘The Strategy of  
Peace’ (1944) 49 The American Journal of  Sociology 381, 384.
20 The rules of  Germanic Law were originally customary law handed down 
orally in legal narratives. See Dennis Howard Green Medieval Listening and 
Reading: The Primary Reception of  German Literature 800-1300 (Cambridge 
University Press 1994) 39 and Bernhard Rehfeldt ‘Saga und Lagsaga’ 72 
Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 1955: 47
Primitive law does not provide for a centralised organ to 
determine which interpretation is conclusive. The A-clan and the 
W-clan may differ about who is the legal organ and who is the 
band of criminals. Without centralisation we have a plurality of 
legal truths. 
Modern law differs from primitive law in that it tries to do 
away with this defect by centralising the application (and also the 
creation) of  the law.  
What is important, however, is that this centralisation of the 
application of primitive law can itself only be effected by primitive 
means. The transition from primitive law to modern law cannot, 
by definition, avail itself of the means of modern law. 
Centralisation thus has to be created by primitive means. There has 
to be a decentralised creation of  centralisation. 
What, then, is centralisation? If we want to centralise the 
application of primitive law, all we have to do is to add (actually 
replace) a condition in our rule. The condition which the original 
primitive rule sets down for the loss of membership and thus for 
the legal irrelevance of killing someone is that this someone has 
actually killed a member. A centralised version of this rule would 
add the condition that a certain organ determines that the person 
in question has killed a member. Actually, the centralised rule 
would replace the requirement ‘if someone takes the life of a 
member’ with ‘if a competent organ declares that someone has 
PRIMITIVE LAW 12
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taken the life of a member’. This is all that is needed for 
centralisation.21 
Still, what we have before us are two conditionals, two 
statements which make the occurrence of two different facts the 
conditions of allowing everyone to interpret the killing of 
someone as legally irrelevant. Now, even in the centralised version 
of the law, the application of the conditional (i.e. the 
establishment of the fact that conditions the interpretation of 
killing someone as legally irrelevant), is still entrusted to everyone. 
It cannot be otherwise. Thus even the centralised version of the 
rule is applied in a decentralised manner. Whereas in the original, 
decentralised version everyone was called to establish for himself 
or herself that someone has actually killed  a member, the 
centralised version entrusts to everyone to decide whether the 
competent organ has actually declared that someone has taken the 
life of a member. Now, it is regularly much easier to reach 
agreement on the fact that someone has declared something rather 
than on the fact that someone has killed someone. The 
controversy of the decentralised determination ‘What has really 
happened back then?’ is reduced to the less onerous, yet still 
decentralised determination of ‘What has the judge said and is he 
really a judge?’ 
PRIMITIVE LAW 13
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21 Here an actual fact is replaced by the declaration of  an actual fact. Simply adding 
the declaration of  a fact to the fact itself  would not result in centralisation, but 
in the two-pronged system of  centralisation and decentralisation: if  the rule 
stated as its condition that ‘someone has actually killed someone and a 
competent organ declares that someone has actually killed someone’ this would 
allow for a situation in which the organ declares that A has killed B, yet C knows 
(or believes to know) that in fact A has not killed B. Centralisation is thus first 
and foremost a remedy to perspectivism and the epistemological problem of  
opinion. Legal utterances have to be understood in a constitutive and not in a 
declaratory sense and this owes to the demands of  centralisation. In this context 
the term ‘constitutive’ is used in the classic juristic sense, as opposed to 
‘declaratory’ and not in the Searlian sense, which is opposed to ‘regulatory’. 
Understanding the utterance of  a competent organ in a merely declaratory sense 
means that we do not take the organ to determine what is the case but we take 
the facts themselves to determine what is the case and we take the organ only to 
declare what is determined in the facts themselves. This, however, means 
nothing but that we ultimately want everyone to determine by himself  or herself 
what is the case. Someone has to decide. The law cannot chose between either 
letting the facts or letting an organ decide. It can only chose between letting 
everyone or letting someone decide. The difference between declaratory and 
constitutive statements is thus a difference between decentralised and 
centralised determination of  facts. 
This centralisation by decentralised means indicates that an 
understanding of the law which focuses on commands is 
incomplete. The command enters the legal stage as the content of 
the decree of the judge (or the legislator). However, as we have 
seen, the command of the judge is but a condition of the 
applicability of a rule which has to be applied by everyone, i.e. has 
to be applied in a decentralised manner. The command thus always 
rests on a more fundamental rule, a rule, however, which cannot 
be understood as a command. 
Over the centuries modern law has heaped ever new levels 
of centralisation onto the primitive law, it has folded the primitive 
law onto itself again and again. It has centralised the infliction of 
sanctions, the creations of rules and parts of rules, the 
establishment of legal organs, and so on. The tools by which this 
has been done, however, have not changed. Thus, since the 
centralisation can only be achieved by decentralised means, there 
remains an unresolvable primitivity in even the most advanced 
forms of  law. 
C. Conclusion
The law orders society by schematising interpretation. It orders 
society not by demanding or prohibiting action, but by allowing a 
certain interpretation of states of affairs, ultimately, the 
interpretation of violence as legally irrelevant. By allowing to 
interpret certain forms of violence as legally irrelevant, the law 
monopolises force and thus creates a coercive order that pacifies 
the land. The function of the law  is to create peace and it achieves 
this peace by interpretation. 
We are used to thinking about the law  as being a body of norms 
enhanced by some kind of coercive apparatus. We are used to 
thinking that the law needs the state to enforce it. This view, 
however, obfuscates the insight that law and state are co-originial. 
The law  does not need a coercive apparatus to enforce it, rather 
the law consists in declaring certain forms of coercion lawful and 
thus turning these forces into a coercive apparatus. 
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